Guide to Strategic Nuclear Defense, Feasible or Fallible? A Public Forum [videorecording]

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Overview

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Scope and Contents note
Lowell Wood, Special Studies Group Leader, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and X-ray laser expert debates
Wolfgang Panofsky, Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator and Fellow, Center for International Security and Arms Control on
the subject of nuclear defense. Dr. Wood maintains that strategic defense does have technical support; that the emphasis
on defense will lead the human race away from the trap of nuclear destruction since the current policy of deterrence is
extremely unstable. Dr. Panofsky counters by pointing out that all studies have concluded that offense can always defeat
defense, and that there are too many technical problems with strategic defense to pursue it.

Access Terms
Deterrence (Strategy)
Nuclear weapons--United States.
United States--Defenses.

General Note
Taped at Stanford University?

Participants / Performers
Moderator: Albert Hastorf.

Box 1
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